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Evil-Twin is becoming a common attack in smart home environments where an attacker can set up a fake AP to compromise
the security of the connected devices. To identify the fake APs, The current approaches of detecting Evil-Twin attacks all rely on
information such as SSIDs, theMAC address of the genuine AP, or network traffic patterns. However, such information can be faked
by the attacker, often leading to low detection rates and weak protection. This paper presents a novel Evil-Twin attack detection
method based on the received signal strength indicator (RSSI). Our approach considers the RSSI as a fingerprint of APs and uses
the fingerprint of the genuine AP to identify fake ones.We provide two schemes to detect a fake AP in two different scenarios where
the genuine AP can be located at either a single or multiple locations in the property, by exploiting the multipath effect of theWi-Fi
signal. As a departure from prior work, our approach does not rely on any professional measurement devices. Experimental results
show that our approach can successfully detect 90% of the fake APs, at the cost of a one-off, modest connection delay.
1. Introduction
Smart homes consist of many intelligent, automation systems
which are often connected to each other and the Internet
through Wi-Fi to provide the inhabitants with sophisticated
monitoring and control over the property’s functions. Smart
homes are increasingly becoming a target for cyber attackers
[1–4]. Many of smart home targeting attacks exploit a tech-
nique called Evil-Twin where an adversary makes a rogue
(i.e., Evil-Twin) access point (AP) with the same identity
(or SSID) as an authorized AP, hoping that many of the
wireless clients will connect to the rogue AP due to the
commonly used automatic access point selection option [5].
An adversary can use an Evil-TwinAP as a platform to launch
a variety of attacks, including privacy and data theft. Privacy
concerns become evident because there are a large number of
private data by various applications in the smart city, such as
sensitive data of governments or proprietary information of
enterprises [6].
How to detect Evil-Twin AP has recently received much
attention [7, 8]. Generally speaking, there are twowidely used
approaches in this domain. The first approach uses traffic
characteristics from the network flow [9, 10] to detect rogue
APs. By analyzing information such as the packet arrival time,
the request/response time of TCP ACKs, one can distinguish
authorized APs from fake ones. Such approaches, however,
depend on many environmental factors, such as the type and
bandwidth of the network and traffic congestion (which can
change from time to time). Therefore, such an approach is
only applicable to a limited set of environments where the
network traffic pattern is known ahead of time and is sta-
ble. The second approach, namely, fingerprint identification
detection, uses hardware features [11–18], to identify rogue
APs. This requires collecting fingerprint information from
the hardware and systems software components (e.g., the
firmware, the chip, and the driver) of the authentic APs.
This approach is based on an assumption that it is difficult
for the attacker to set up an AP with identical hardware
information. However, building a fingerprint library is non-
trivial and extracting the fingerprints from the APs could
be time-consuming.These drawbacks make such approaches
infeasible when real-time is an essential requirement.
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This paper introduces a novel method for detecting Evil-
Twin APs. Our approach targets smart homes. Our approach
exploits the following observations: (1) the position of an AP
is often fixed in a smart home environment; (2) the received
signal strength indicator (RSSI) of a fixed AP is relatively
stable. We consider the RSSI signal as the fingerprint of
a genuine AP and use this information to identify rogue
APs. One of the advantages of our approach is that we do
not require any additional sensor/actuator infrastructure.
Instead, we first use the stable RSSI to estimate the distance
between the signal point and the receiving point [19–27] and
then use the distance to detect rogue Evil-Twin APs.We show
that our approach achieves on average a successful rate of over
90% with a one-off connection delay of less than 20 seconds.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel Evil-Twin
attack detection system based on RSSI. We have shown that
RSSI is a viable means for detecting rogue APs in smart home
environments. Although our approach is evaluated in a smart
home environment, similar ideas can be expanded to other
Wi-Fi environments.
2. Background
SSID and BSSID are always used to identify Wi-Fi hot point
since the protocol 802.11 does not define a strong sign to
do it. In fact, both of them could be easily got by attacker,
because the wireless network not only shares the media but
also cannot control the signal range. Although the access
point is protected by password and sophisticated encryption,
for an experienced attacker, it is not difficult to crack it
during a short time.The original 802.11 security organization
that try to solve these problems was the Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP). In spite of having mechanisms to provide
authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity, WEP was
found to be unsafe and trivially cracked after an attacker has
gathered enough frames with the same initialization vector
[28]. By actively accelerating the gather of frames, the latest
WEP attack is able to complete breaking of WEP in under a
minute [29]. WEP is increasingly being replaced by the Wi-
Fi Protected Access (WPA). Nevertheless, to hold backward
compatibility, WPA has not totally solved some security
problems. Because control and management frames can be
tricked and faked even with WPA enabled, wireless Local
Area Networks (LANS) reserve impressionable to identity
attacks and denial of service attacks [12]. Once the attacker
got the password, they will soon forge the same one called
the Evil-Twin AP (i.e., the rogue or fake AP), which is not
easily recognized by user. Over the past few years, this kind
of attack mainly exists in some public environments such as
airports and cafes. However, as the development of the IoT,
nowadays gigantic crowd-sourced data from mobile devices
have become widely available in social networks [30], the
attack value of private Wi-Fi rises rapidly, and the attack
develops towards the private Wi-Fi in the smart home and
other environments, such as privacy concerns that become
evident on the cloud because there are a lot of private data in
multimedia data sets [31].Once the user connects the network
to the fake AP, the intruder can control the network environ-
ment of the user, and further, privacy sniffing, malicious data
tampering, and other advanced attacks can be realized. The
behavior of the intelligent device even can be controlled, for
instance, opening or closing an intelligent lock.
According to the IEEE 802.11 standard, when there are
multiple APs nearby, the one with the strongest signal is
to be chosen [16]. So the fake AP is always putting at the
nearest of attack target in order to be chosen. This kind of
attack can be called Fishing, which contains active Fishing
and passive Fishing. Passive Fishing is named because the
fake AP is just waiting for the connection from the terminal.
This kind of attack cannot easily be found since it does not
affect the Real AP; at the same time, the attack successful rate
is not high. Active Fishing means that to connect with the
terminal, fake AP cut the connection between Real AP and
the terminal by Evil-Twin attack. Such attack can be carried
out to precise attacks without affecting the other equipment
except the target.
3. Attacking Scenarios
Attacking Scenarios. Figure 1 illustrates the scenarios where
the Evil-Twin attack can be applied. Evil-Twin is designed
to look like real Wi-Fi hotspots. In those scenarios, the
adversary is able to set a fake AP to launch an Evil-Twin
attack from a laptop. Its signal might be stronger to the victim
than the Real AP. Once disconnected from the legitimate
Real AP, the tool then forces offline computers and devices to
automatically reconnect to the Evil-Twin, allowing the hacker
to intercept all the traffic to that device.When people in smart
homes are using the Internet through an Evil-Twin, they
can unknowingly expose their passwords and other sensitive
online data to hackers. According to the Wi-Fi Alliance,
a sophisticated Evil-Twin can even control what websites
appear when users access the Internet. That allows hackers
to capture their passwords.
Our Assumptions. Our attacks require the adversary to set
up the Evil-Twin at different locations. We believe that the
adversary may not set the fake AP very close to the smart
homes in order to avoid being caught. If a profile for the
legitimate AP exists, the client device will automatically
connect to the faked AP.
4. DRET Overview
Figure 2 is shown as the overview of DRET System. DRET
is a system that helps wireless home owner to discover
and prevent evil access points (AP) from attacking wireless
users. The application can be run in regular intervals to
protect your wireless network from Evil-Twin attacks. By
configuring the tool you can get notifications sent to your
alarm signal whenever an evil access point is discovered.
Additionally you can configure DRET to performDoS on the
legitimate wireless users to prevent them from connecting
to the discovered evil AP in order to give the administrator
more time to react. However, notice that the DoS will only
be performed for evil APs which have the same SSID but
different BSSID (AP’sMACaddress) or running on a different









Figure 1: Example scenarios in which the attacker can easily launch an Evil-Twin attack to steal information using a fake AP. This kind of
attack typically happens when a hacker constructs a mock (but still functional)Wi-Fi access point (AP) right at the place where there ought to
be an original and legitimate access point.The reason this works so well is that, for a well-orchestrated attack, the illegitimate AP has stronger
signals than the legitimate one and hence the unsuspecting users might log on to this mock-up connection and then use the Internet while
sharing all their precious data, all the way from their user’s IDs and passwords to credit/debit card information.
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Figure 2: The overview of DRET System. DRET mainly consists of three parts (SDSP, SDMP, and MDMP).
channel. This method can prevent DoS from attacking your
legitimate network.
Following a common practice in fake AP detection,
DRET will choose different modules depending on different
circumstances. SDSPmeet the simple scenario such as during
night and when nobody is at home. However, SDSP is limited
and the success rate is closely related to the detector location.
To address this limitation, SDMP is proposed, which locates
the mobile phone firstly; the RSS fingerprint value is drawn
to SDSP (e), so the SDSP can determine the location of
legitimacy (f); the result returns to SDMP. Sometimes in
many devices working in multiplaces, these devices need to
use only one set of fingerprint data to check at the same time.
MDMPwill start; the RSSI is adjusted and then sent to SDMP
(g); the result done by SDMP returns to MDMP (h).
5. Preliminaries
In order to construct a real environment, the attacker will do
everything to improve the fake AP so that it has the same
features of a Real AP, including traffic characteristics and
hardware fingerprint characteristics. In real-world applica-
tions, the environmentmay have some negative effects on the
identification of the target [32]. However, the attacker cannot
forge the position of the Real AP. Recent literature advances
Wi-Fi signals to “see” people’s motions and locations. By
detecting and analyzing signal reflection, they enable Wi-Fi
to “see” target objects [33]. In smart homes, the intuition
underlying our design is that each Real AP has its fixed
position, and the attacker cannot put the fake AP exactly in
the right place.Therefore, a new smart home fakeAPdetected
method based on RSSI is proposed in this paper.












Figure 3: The figure shows two Real APs (in green) and two Fake
APs (in red). The figure illustrates how the detector (in black)
recognizes the FAP by using the differences of the RSSI that the APs
locate differently.
Figure 3 is shown as the principle of fake AP detection
based on RSSI. RAP and FAP are, respectively, represented
Real AP and fake AP. Detector receives the signal from
each AP. 𝐷1 is the distance between the 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟1 and the
Real AP, and 𝐷1󸀠 is the distance between the 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟1 and
the fake AP. If 𝐷1 is greater than 𝐷1󸀠, it means that the
intensity of 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟1 received from the fake AP is stronger
than the real one. In general, when there exists multipath
effect, detector always chooses the strongest signal in the
homologous signals. So, undoubtedly, when the attacker
turns on FAP1, 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟1 will choose it rather than the real
RAP1. But when the attacker turns off the FAP1, 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟1
will choose RAP. According to the upper analysis, we can
easily identify the fake AP from the real one by comparing
the RSSI of them. In this scene, If RSSI󸀠1 is greater than RSSI1,
it means that FAP1 is fake AP.
However, there is another scene where the distance
between the Real AP and detector is less than the fake ones.
In this condition, no matter how open or shut down the fake
AP is, the detector would always choose the Real AP. So, we
should try to build a scene like the previous one, namely,
moving the detection’s position to 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟2, making 𝐷3󸀠
greater than𝐷3; then we can detect the fake AP.
In free space, the path loss of signal propagation expresses
signal attenuation, which is defined as the difference value
between the effective radiated power and the received power.
So the path loss in free space can be computed by the
following formula. 𝐺𝑡 and 𝐺𝑟 separately express the antenna
gain of the sender and the receiver. 𝜆 indicates the signal wave
length; 𝑑 is the distance between the sender and receiver.
PL (dB) = 10 log 𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑟 = −10 log[ 𝐺𝑡𝐺𝑟𝜆
2
(4𝜋)2 𝑑2] . (1)
Frequency of Wi-Fi channel 1∼13 is from 2.412 ∗109∼2.472 ∗ 109. And there exists 𝜆 = 𝑐/𝑓 and 𝑐 ≈ 3 ∗108m/s, so the value range of 𝜆 is 0.1214∼0.1244.We did some
experiment to study factors effecting the attenuation and the
attenuation curve is shown in Figure 4. In Figure 4(a), both
of the sender and receiver have unity-gain, and the channel is
1. In Figure 4(b), both of the sender and receiver have unity-
gain, and the channel is 13. In Figure 4(c), the antenna gain
product of the sender and receiver is 100, and the channel
is 13. From Figure 4, we can find the following rules. (1)
From (a) and (b), we can find that the effect of channel on
attenuation is very small. (2) From (b) and (c), we can find
that antenna gain has a great influence on attenuation. (3)
From (a), (b), and (c), we can find that the distance is the
main factor to affect the attenuation, and the attenuation is
less sensitive to the distance with the increase of distance.
RSSI (Signal Strength Indicator Received) is the intensity
of the received signal; its value can be calculated by the
following formula: RSSI = Transmit Power + antenna gain −
path loss.
For a fixed transmitter and receiver, the Transmit Power
and antenna gain are both constant, and the path loss is a
function of the distance𝐷, so RSSI can be expressed as RSSI =𝑓(𝑑). Then 𝑑 will be 𝑑 = 𝑓󸀠(RSSI). Therefore, RSSI can be
used directly to replace the distance for positioning.
In order to be simplify the calculation, we proposed signal
space and signal distance. Signal distance can be abbreviated
as sd; then sd = |RSSI|. In Figure 5, the left is the physical
space, and the right is the signal space. Both of them take AP
as the reference point. Points a, b, c, and d are the position
of four mobile phones. In the physical space, the distance
separately between a, c, and d is equal, less than the distance
between b andAP. But there are obstacles at the points a andd,
where the attenuation of the black obstacle is higher than the
gray obstacle, so sda > sdd > sdc and sdb > sdc. In general,
the signal strength of straight line is the best when there is
no obstacle, and wireless devices always give priority to the
best signal when dealing with multipath effects. So, from the
physical space to the signal space, the distance of their signal
has some slight changes, which is shown as the right figure.
In order to verify that the RSSI can be used as the defec-
tion factor, we did an experiment. In normal circumstances,
we build a fingerprint library by using the signal distance.
Terminal MX3 is used as director to collect RSSI signal and
the TL-WR882N is used as AP. The distance between them
is 5m, and data collection rate is 2 times per second. We
collected about 14000 of the total data, keeping surrounding
environment not changed during the process of collecting
data, except when someone walked across. Its probability
distribution histogram is shown in Figure 6.
By analyzing the experiment data, it is found that the
measured value of the actual measurement is near to a
stable value, and the probability distribution is approximately
normal distribution. That means the RSSI can be used as the
defection factor.
Actually, it seems that both of the fake and Real AP is
similar to the detector, which are difficult to be distinguished.
According to multipath effect, the detector will select the
one with the strongest signal to associate and compute
the distance between the selected AP and it, which will
be compared with the distance recorded in signal distance
fingerprint database. If they are different, that means the
AP should be forged. The mobile phone will be used as the
detector. Depending on whether the mobile phone used as a
detector in smart home is moving or not, two different kinds
of solution have been proposed in this paper; they are a single
fixed position detection and the multiposition collaborative
detection.
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Physical space Signal space
Figure 5: Physical space convert to signal space.
6. Automated Detection Analysis
6.1. A Single Fixed Position Detection. Smart homes devices
still need work under networking even if there is nobody at
home, so the detector can also finish the detecting of false
AP. Therefore, we install the detector in a fixed position,
and let it work 24 hours. Detector establishes target AP RSSI
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Figure 6: Probability distribution histogram.
sample when detecting. Only the detected distance is within
the error range of distances recorded in fingerprint database;
it is considered as the fake AP; otherwise, it is true AP.
It is assumed that the deployment of hot spot and detector
is shown in Figure 7. The position of fake AP and true AP is
different, but the other features are the same, such as network
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Figure 7: A single fixed position detection.
Table 1: FSSI and variance in the security state.
Location Average Variance
A 𝜇A = −50 𝜎A
B 𝜇B = −50 𝜎B
C 𝜇C = −75 𝜎C
card hardware features, antenna gain, and stability. A, B, and
C are the positions of three detectors. The signal intensity of
true AP and fake AP is the same in the position A (shown as𝑌2 axis). The signal intensity of true AP is stronger than ones
of fake AP in the position B and the opposite in position C.
In the security state, that is, where the fake AP does not
exist, the RSSI and variance of signal intensity separately
received by three detectors at positions A, B, and C are shown
in Table 1.
Fake APs working will lead to multipath effect.Therefore,
it is assumed that 𝑃A, 𝑃B, and 𝑃C are the probability of select-
ing true AP signal in A, B, and C. Under ideal conditions,0 ≤ 𝑃C < 𝑃A = 0.5 < 𝑃B ≤ 1, and the new average and
variance are shown in Table 2. Both of them wave in a certain
range of fluctuation due to kinds of factors like the multipath
effect, the external interference, and so forth. It is assumed
that the average an variance meet the following conditions:𝜇 −𝑀 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝜇 +𝑀, 𝜎 ≤ Σ.
From Figure 7, we can see that when the detector is
in region C, it will select fake AP whose signal intensity is
stronger than the Real APs, which can be described with a
formula like 𝜇󸀠 > 𝜇. When 𝜇󸀠 > 𝜇 +𝑀, we can say that there
exists a fakeAP in the network.When the detector is in region
A, 𝜇󸀠 = 𝜇; that means we cannot distinguish the Real AP and
the fake one. In region B, although the signal intensity of Real
AP is higher than fake AP, but the detector considers both of
them are the same signal; the latter still cannot be detected.
As analysis shows detector and Real AP cannot be too
close that will lead to high misdetection rate, so the best
deployment location of detector is in region C where the
signal is weak, far away from the Real AP and near the fake
AP.
Table 2: FSSI and variance when fake AP is working.
Location Average Variance
A 𝜇󸀠A = 𝜇A = −50 𝜎󸀠A = 𝜎A
B −75 < 𝜇󸀠B < −50 𝜎󸀠B > 𝜎B
C 75 < 𝜇󸀠C < −50 𝜎󸀠C > 𝜎C
6.2. Multiposition Detection. Obviously, a single fixed posi-
tion detection method can only solve part of the problem. In
this part, multiposition detection is proposed. Multiposition
detection relies on mobile phones; with it we can convert
multiposition to single fixed position detection. So, first
what we need to do is determine the position of the mobile
phone.Themost well-known and highly accurate positioning
method is GPS, while GPS devices have been known to not
work very well indoors. In this paper, we use theWi-Fi signal
for locating the position of mobile phone by three-point
positioning method. With the popularity of Wi-Fi, there are
almost always more than three Wi-Fi hotspots that will be
found when we are indoors.
As shown in Figure 8, AP1, AP2, and AP3 are three
different APs, assuming their positions are known. O is the
mobile phone’s position.The original distance can be defined
as sd which represents the distance between AP and mobile
phone. sd𝑖 = |OO𝑖|, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. So AP1, AP2, and AP3 can
locate the position of the mobile phone in the signal space.
Then we can convert the multiposition detection to a single
fixed position detection.
There are two stages in multiposition cooperative detec-
tion: fingerprint gathering stage and detection stage. The
first stage should be done in a safe state; we collect the
RSSI information both of reference AP and target AP in
many different positions, to build a fingerprint library. In the
detection stage, using reference AP to locate the phone and
the fingerprint data in a single fixed position detection, the
program framework is shown in Figure 8; we can locate the
mobile phone’s position by using reference AP and then using
the method mentioned in the previous chapter to detect.
In Figure 9, AP0 is the target AP, AP2∼AP𝑛 are the
candidate’s reference AP, and the whole process can be
divided into the following 5 steps:
Stepe: RSSI acquisition.
Stepf: effective data selection.
Stepg: establishment of fingerprint database.
Steph: mobile position determination.
Stepi: validity judgment.
6.2.1. RSSI Acquisition. In the experiment, the value of RSSI
is collected by mobile phone; the detection program can
import correspondingmanagement package and call relevant
interface (Android: android.net.wifi.*; IOS: SystemConfigu-
ration/CaptiveNetwork.h) so that it can make mobile phone
acquire enough RISS value in daily routines.



















Figure 8: Multiposition detection transformation.The figure shows that any three APs could be chosen as reference in the signal space.They





























Figure 9: Multiposition detection framework.
6.2.2. Effective Data Selection
Effective RSSI Values Selection. It is a challenging job to choose
the right RSSI values since the mobile phones are always
moving. However the RSSI value we need should be waved
in a small range, which is shown in Figure 10. The data in
two boxes are what we want; the others are generated by
mobile phone when it is moving. When the distance between
mobile phone and AP is 1m and there is no interference, it
can generate the data in the first box. Data in the second box
is generated in the condition that the distance betweenmobile
phone andAP is 4mand there are two sources of interference.
The other data is generated in the condition that someone
takes the mobile phone and go around the house with the
speed of 1.5m/s.
In the first experiment, variance increment method is
used to judge whether the mobile phone is moving. It is
assumed that the size of sliding window is 120. When the
amount of data is less than the window, it is invalid data.
𝑊𝑖 = {𝑟𝑖−ws+1, 𝑟𝑖−ws+2, . . . , 𝑟𝑖−1, 𝑟𝑖} 𝑖 ≥ ws, 𝑟𝑖 ∈ 𝑅. (2)
𝑅 is the whole RSSI sequence, 𝑟𝑖 is the value of RSSI, and
ws is the window size.
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Figure 10: The RSSI sequence.










Figure 11: The RSSI sequence variance.
The variance can be used to measure the deviation
between the RSSI data and themean value of the window.The
variance of𝑊𝑖 is 𝜎𝑖 which expresses the data fluctuation of𝑊𝑖.
The greater the data fluctuation, the greater the variance.
As shown in Figure 11, the window size is 120, with two
peaks in the middle corresponding to the moving process;
that is, it corresponds to the parts not in those two boxes
in Figure 10. However, the cause of the big variance is not
necessarily a person’smovement; the stability of the signalwill
also affect it.Therefore, the slope of the variance curve is used
to determine whether the current is moving. The variance
increment
𝑘 (𝑖) = 𝑑𝜎𝑖𝑑𝑖 = 𝜎𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖−1𝑖 − (𝑖 − 1) = 𝜎𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖−1. (3)
In Formula (3), 𝜎𝑖 is the variance of 𝑊𝑖 and 𝜎𝑖−1 is the
variance of𝑊𝑖−1.
The improved results are shown in Figure 12. When 𝑘(𝑖)
is near to 0, it means that the original variance is stable in
a certain range; that also means the mobile phone is not
moving or moving in a small range. We set a threshold to
detect whether the mobile phone is moving. If |𝑘(𝑖)| ≤ 𝐾, the
mobile phone is considered to be stable; otherwise it means
the position of mobile phone has changed.
Those sequences with a stable position have the following
characteristics:
Start point: [|𝑘(𝑖)| ≤ 𝐾] − ws(+1).
End point: [|𝑘(𝑖)| > 𝐾] − ws/2.
Effective Reference AP Selection. In order to improve the
accuracy of multiposition detection, it is needed to improve
the accuracy of the location. Because of the complexity of
the wireless signal transmission in the indoor environment,














Figure 12: RSSI sequence variance.
the AP signal is not stable. In the network environment, a
position can be detected by more than one AP. Therefore,
signal stability and the relevance with target AP are the two
factors in choosing AP. Relevance here means that both the
target AP and the reference AP moving with the mobile
phone; that is why the fluctuations of the variance between
the target AP and the reference AP should be consistent.
We use dynamic (dynamic time warping, DTW [34])
algorithm to calculate the distance and determine the validity
of the reference AP. DTW is a method that calculates an
optimal match between two given sequences (e.g., time
series) with certain restrictions. The sequences are “warped”
nonlinearly in the time dimension to determine a measure of
their similarity independent of certain nonlinear variations
in the time dimension. This sequence alignment method is
often used in time series classification.
As is shown in Figure 13, (a) calculates distance without
using dynamic time but (b) uses it; by using dynamic time, (b)
can reach theminimumdistortion when it comes to calculate
the distance.
When selecting the effective reference AP, each AP is
considered as the candidate referenceAP.The large number of
its variance increment is stored aswell as the distance between
its variance increment sequence and the target’s. After getting
the distance of all candidate reference APs and target APs, all
candidate reference APs will be ordered by the distance. The
smaller the distance, the better the effectiveness. Therefore,
four candidate reference APs with theminimumdistance will
be chosen as the reference APs to locate the mobile phone’s
position. In general, three points are enough for location. In
order to prevent that one of the three reference APs from
failure, so we choose four reference APs from the candidate
lists.
6.2.3. Establishment of Fingerprint Database. The RSSI fin-
gerprint library (RSSI-MAP) is built by the RSSI sequence
generated in previous section. RSSI-MAP is shown in Table 3.𝑅𝐽 = (𝑟1,𝐽, 𝑟2,𝐽, . . . , 𝑟𝐿,𝐽) represent the fingerprint information
in RSSI-MAP. 𝐽 is the position where the mobile phone is
stayed for detecting. 𝐿 is the number of candidate reference
APs. 𝑟 is the fingerprint information of AP, which can
be described by triple like 𝑟(rssi, var, len). Items in triple
represent the average, variance, and length of RSSI sequence.
6.2.4. Mobile Position Determination. 𝑅𝑇 = (𝑟1,𝑇, 𝑟2,𝑇, . . . ,𝑟𝐿,𝑇) represents RSSI fingerprinting information of the refer-
ence APs detected at the position 𝑇. 𝑅󸀠𝑇 = 𝑟󸀠0,𝑇 represents the
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Figure 13: Dynamic time warp (DTW).
Table 3: Structure of RSSI-MAP.
Location Reference AP Target AP
1 𝑅1 = (𝑟1,1, 𝑟2,1, . . . , 𝑟𝐿,1) 𝑅󸀠1 = 𝑟0,1
2 𝑅2 = (𝑟1,2, 𝑟2,2, . . . , 𝑟𝐿,2) 𝑅󸀠2 = 𝑟0,2... ... ...𝐽 𝑅𝐽 = (𝑟1,𝐽, 𝑟2,𝐽, . . . , 𝑟𝐿,𝐽) 𝑅󸀠𝐽 = 𝑟0,𝐽
RSSI fingerprinting information of the target AP detected by
the position 𝑇. Dist(𝑅𝑇, 𝑅𝐽) is the distance between 𝑅𝑇 and𝑅𝐽. rssi𝑖,𝑇 is the average value of RSSI for reference AP; rssi𝑖,𝐽
is the average of the RSSI sequence for reference AP. 𝐽 is the
position where the distance between𝑇 and one in RSSI-MAP
is the shortest.When there aremore than three referenceAPs,
we can locate the mobile phone.
Dist (𝑅𝑇, 𝑅𝐽) = √ 𝐿∑
𝑖=1
(rssi𝑖,𝑇 − rssi𝑖,𝐽)2. (4)
Dist(𝑅𝑇, 𝑅𝐽) in Formula (4) depend on the number of 𝐿,
in order to reduce the effect on Dist𝑇 that the number of
reference AP is different in different position. The formula is
improved as the following.
Dist𝑇 = min[Dist (𝑅𝑇, 𝑅𝐽)𝐿 ] . (5)
When 𝐿 is greater than or equal to 3, the fingerprint of
the first three APs can be used for location by using Formulas
(4) and (5). When 𝐿 is equal to 2, there will be more than
one position and all of them have the same distance. Then
we should choose the one who is the nearest one with the
target AP. When 𝐿 is equal to 1, in order to increase the
accuracy of the positioning, the variance is used tomeasuring
the similarity between position 𝑇 and position 𝐽. From the
previous section, the RSSI form one AP at the same position
which is approximate normal distribution; that is, the RSSI
sequence is represented as follows:
𝑃 (rssi) = 1√2𝜋𝜎𝑒(rssi−𝜇)2/2𝜎2 . (6)
In Formula (6), 𝜎 = var; 𝜇 = rssi.
In the information theory, KL [35, 36] (Kullback-Leibler,
divergence) can be used to describe the difference between
two probability distributions of 𝑄 and 𝑃; 𝐷KL(𝑃 ‖ 𝑄) is the
information loss caused by that 𝑄 which is used to fit the
true distribution 𝑃. So the distance between the 𝑇 and the
RSSI probability distribution can be calculated using the KL
divergence. KL divergence is defined in
𝐷KL (𝑃 ‖ 𝑄) = ∑𝑃 (𝑖) ln 𝑃 (𝑖)𝑄 (𝑖) . (7)
So, we can get formula (8) from formula (6) and formula
(7).
Dist (𝑅𝑇, 𝑅𝐽) = 𝐷KL (𝑅𝑇 ‖ 𝑅𝐽)
= 0∑
rssi=−100
𝑃 (rssi)2 [(rssi − 𝜇1)
2
𝜎21 −
(rssi − 𝜇2)2𝜎22 ] .
(8)
In the formula (8),𝜎1 = var𝐿,𝑇,
𝜇1 = rssi𝐿,𝑇,𝜎2 = var𝐿,𝐽,
𝜇2 = rssi𝐿,𝐽,




Then, according to the distance got by formula (8), the
nearest neighbor algorithm is used to find the corresponding
position in the 𝐽 RSSI-MAP.
6.2.5. Legitimacy Judgment. max(rssi) represents the maxi-
mummean of target RSSI at position 𝐽. It can be easily query
in RSSI-MAP when we find the position 𝐽. rssi is the mean
value being detected. Then, there is Diff𝑇 = rssi −max(rssi).
If Dist𝑇 ≤ 𝑀 and Diff𝑇 ≤ 0, it is safe and there is no fake
AP.
If Dist𝑇 ≤ 𝑀 and Diff𝑇 > 0, it is unsafe and there exits
fake AP.
If Dist𝑇 > 𝑀, fingerprint database should be updated.
You can find the details in next section.
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6.2.6. Dynamic Update of Fingerprint Database. Thedynamic
update of RSSI fingerprint database consists of two parts: one
is the addition of the new fingerprint, and the other is the
update of the existing fingerprint.
The new fingerprint should be added because of various
reasons in the training phase of the RSSI fingerprint database.
It cannot cover all the spatial subregions of 𝑀, so it is
necessary to improve the fingerprint database in the later
stage.
The update of the existing fingerprint is caused by
environmental changes such as survival status of reference
AP, the correlation between the candidate reference AP and
the target AP, and the change of the reference AP’s position.
At this point, we need to update the fingerprint information
which already exists in the fingerprint database in detection
stage.
[𝑅𝐽 (𝑟1,𝐽, 𝑟2,𝐽, . . . , 𝑟𝐿,𝐽) , 𝑅󸀠𝐽 (𝑟0,𝐽)] . (10)
Assume there are four valid candidate reference APs;
they are AP1,AP2,AP3,AP4, and the relationship or their
effectiveness is as the following: 𝐸1 > 𝐸2 > 𝐸3 > 𝐸4; then
there is Dist𝑇 = Dist𝑇(AP1,AP2,AP3). The corresponding
position is 𝐽.
When there is Dist𝑇 > 𝑀
Dist𝑇3 = Dist𝑇 (AP1,AP2,AP4) ,
Dist𝑇2 = Dist𝑇 (AP1,AP3,AP4) ,
Dist𝑇1 = Dist𝑇 (AP2,AP3,AP4) .
(11)
If Dist𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑀, then we can use 𝑟𝑖,𝑇 instead of 𝑟𝑖,𝐽 in the
RSSI-MAP to update the existing fingerprint. If Dist𝑇𝑖 > 𝑀,
then put (𝑅𝑇, 𝑅󸀠𝑇) into the RSSI-MAP. If Dist𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑀 and𝑟𝑖,𝑡len ≥ 𝑟𝑖,𝑗len, then we can use 𝑟𝑖,𝑇 instead 𝑟𝑖,𝐽 in the RSSI-
MAP.
7. Evaluation in SPD and MPD
In order to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the AP
Evil-Twin detection method based on RSSI, we implement a
number of experiments.
We use the Terminal MX3 to collect RSSI signal. The TL-
WR882N is used as the true AP. A fake AP has been simulated
by hostapd in a notebook. The experiment is done in a room
with 100 square meters. In the detection phase, we set the
different 𝐹 − 𝑅 (𝐹 − 𝑅 is defined as the mean difference,
resp., between the fake AP and the true AP’s RSSI. The mean
difference is equal to the distance between two APs.).
7.1. Experiment and Assessment for Single Position Detection
Discussion of SlidingWindowSize.Theprevious section shows
the size of the sliding window affects the delay rate and false
negative rate of detection.That means the bigger the window,
the higher the delay rate, and the higher the false negative rate.
In order to find a suitable value for the size of sliding window,
we design an experiment like the following.
In order to verify the effect of window size on the delay,
we set the mean difference, respectively, between the fake AP
and the true RSSI as 25 and 10; that is, 𝐹−𝑅 = 25 and 𝐹−𝑅 =
10. The window size in turn is 1, 40, 80, 120, 160, 200, and
240.The safety threshold value for each round of detection is
the maximum mean of RSSI in 30 minutes. There are 14 sets
of experiment; each set of experiment will be done 30 times,
and the result is as shown in Figure 14. From (a) we can see
that when the difference of mean between true AP and fake
AP is bigger, the delay rate is smaller. When the window size
is 120, the average delay time is less than 20 s.
To verify the effect of window size on accuracy, when it is
in the condition that 𝐹 − 𝑅 = 10, we set the windows size in
turn: 1, 40, 80, 120, 160, 200, and 240. After the test program
running 10 minutes, open the fake AP and let it run for 3
minutes then close it for 3 minutes, because it needs a certain
delay that the mean value is changed from abnormal status to
normal status.
The mean from abnormal status returning to normal
needs a certain delay, so if there occurs wrong or missed
detection in every 3 minutes after the delay time, it will be
assumed as a wrong one. If there is wrong ormissed detecting
after delayed time, it is considered as the error status. This
experiment is done 50 times, and the result is shown on the
right in Figure 14. According to the experiment results, when
the window size is 80, 120, and 160, the accuracy is more than
98%. If the windows size is too small or too big, the accuracy
is lower since the false positive rate is higher.
Discussion of Threshold Value. In this experiment, we set the
window size as 120 and the 𝐹−𝑅 as 25 or 10. Assume that the
threshold value is 𝑅max, 𝑅max − 2, 𝑅max + 2, 𝑅max + 4,
and 𝑅max + 8. So there are 10 sets of experiment. In each
experiment the following step is done 50 times. After the test
program running 10 minutes, open the fake AP and let it run
for 3 minutes and then close it for 3 minutes. We can get the
result of this experiment from Figure 15, when the security
threshold value is𝑅max and the accuracy is up to 96%.When
the security threshold value is 𝑅max + 2, the accuracy of the
condition is 𝐹 − 𝑅 = 25 up to 100% and 𝐹 − 𝑅 = 25 is 99%.
Discussion of Distance. In this experiment, we set 𝐹 − 𝑅 =
0, 5, 10, 15, and 20, and the threshold value is 𝑅max. Each
experiment is to be done as the following step 50 times. After
the test program is running for 10 minutes, open the fake AP
and let it run for 3minutes and then close it for 3minutes.We
can get the result of this experiment from Figure 16. When𝐹−𝑅 = 10, the accuracy is more than 96%; the missing rate is
less than 3%.
7.2. Experiment and Evaluation of Multiposition
Cooperative Detection
Validation of Variance Increment Method. In this experiment,
the window size is 120, and 𝐾 is 4; then split the RSSI
sequence using Variance increment method. The result is
shown in Table 4. Dropping out the fragment whose length
is shorter than 120, then we can get two effective RSSI
sequence fragments (S 1 and S 10), the total length is 2598,
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Figure 15: Effect of safety threshold on the accuracy of detection.
Table 4: First time to split the RSSI sequence.
Flag Range Length Range Mean
S 1 1–1422 1422 [−52, −35] −45.15
S 2 1366–1431 66 [−44, −39] −42.5
S 3 1424–1502 79 [−84, −38] −50.04
S 4 1489–1560 72 [−100, −64] −91.17
S 5 1507–1569 63 [−100, −87] −95.95
S 6 1552–1620 69 [−100, −72] −90.91
S 7 1609–1718 110 [−76, −38] −56.54
S 8 1660–1726 67 [−75, −40] −56.68
S 9 1669–1731 63 [−75, −40] −59.95
S 10 1861–2848 1168 [−90, −56] −66.37
and the effective fragment lengthwas 2605 in the original data
sequence. So the accuracy is 99.7%.
The Validity of DTW Algorithm. To verify that the DTW
algorithm could be used to choose the valid AP, we open
the detecting software which could find all the AP and get
their RSSI. Then we let the detecting software move with the
speed of 1.5m, staying at three different locations and staying
at each place for 15 minutes. At the end, there are 28 APs
being found, including 1 target AP and 27 candidate reference
APs. For each of 27 candidate reference APs, we use DTW
algorithm to calculate the distance of variance increment
sequence between target AP and it. Finally, we are successful
to find four suitable reference APs.
The Validity of Localization Algorithm. In a room with 100
square meters, we collect a set of data per 4 square meters.
So there are 25 sets of data. In detecting stage, we stayed at
every position for 5minutes, thenmoving to another position
with the speed of 1.5m/s. For the four suitable reference AP
found in previous section, there are three kinds of conditions;
that is, the first 4 AP should be considered as the reference
AP, and the first 3 and the first 2, respectively, calculate their
Euclidean distance. When there is only one reference AP, the
accuracy of location is 62%. When there are two reference
APs, the accuracy of location is 85%. When there are three
reference APs, the accuracy of location is 90%.
The Validity of Multiposition Cooperative Detection. We play
a role of an attack, simulating a fake AP in a notebook. And
the experiment is done still in a roomwith 100 square meters,
dividing it into 25 regions. In each region, we collect data for
every 30 minutes and use the maximum mean of this region
as the safety threshold. In detecting stage, we stayed at every
position for 5 minutes, then moving to another position with
the speed of 1.5m/s. Experiments were carried out for 200
times, 100 times is to open the fake AP, and the other 100
times is to turn off the fake AP. When the fake AP is turned
on, if there is any position detected by the fake AP, then the
detection is successful, if all the positions are not detected by
the fakeAP, then the detection fails. Close the fakeAP; if there
is any position to detect the false AP, then the detection fails;
if all the positions are not detected in the fake AP, then the
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Figure 16: Effect of distance on the detection results.
detection is successful. When there is only one reference AP,
the accuracy of location is 58%.When there are two reference
APs, the accuracy of location is 80%. When there are three
reference APs, the accuracy of location is 90%.
8. Related Work
At present, most Evil-Twin detection methods work for the
public Wi-Fi environment. There are two key approaches in
this domain. One is based on hardware feature; the other is
flow feature.
The hardware feature testing method utilizes the charac-
teristic that different network card chips and different drives
possess different fingerprint features to set up a fingerprint
feature library and decide whether the fake AP existed or
not through matching fingerprint data in the fingerprint
feature library during testing. Bratus et al. [9] send some
SIMULATING frames which possess false formats but are
not prohibited by a standard protocol. Although different
network card chips or drives have different responses to
various SIMULATING frames, the testing method is easy
to be found by an intruder. McCoy et al. [11] characterize
the drivers during the “active scanning period.”This method
is undefined in the IEEE 802.11 standard on the frequency
and order of sending probe requests. Therefore, each man-
ufacturer employs its own algorithm. This technique cannot
distinguish between two devices using the same network
card and driver. So this technique may not be used for
identifying individual devices. However, the attacker cannot
forge the position of the Real AP. In smart homes, the
intuition underlying our design is that each Real AP has
its fixed position, and the attacker cannot put the fake AP
exactly in the right place. Desmond et al. [12] used fingerprint
client station, which sends probe requests in light of periodic
characteristic by surveying probe requests. The period itself
is attached to slight variations. Far from being consistent,
these variations can be clustered. With enough detection
time, each cluster slowly derives, with a slope proportional to
the time skew.This work is able to particularly identify client
station; however, this requires more than one hour of traffic
and is only applicable to client stations. In a word, McCoy
et al. [11] and Desmond et al. [12] utilize the characteristic
that different wireless network cards send different probe
request frames with different periods during scanning to set
up the fingerprint library. As the equipment only sends a
small number of probe request during joining the network
and the method can be valid when passive scanning is used,
the expensive time overhead and the relatively bad real-time
property are involved; Neumann et al. [13] utilize the arrival
time of interframe space to identify the wireless equipment,
but the characteristic can be faked by the intruder and the
testing method based on the characteristic can be bypassed.
The testing methods for the hardware fingerprint feature
of the equipment above-mentioned cut both ways: various
fake AP can be tested effectively and the cost of faking
the hardware feature of the intruder is relatively high; the
fingerprint database can be built in many ways [37], but the
cost of building the hardware feature fingerprint library is
high, the time for extracting the hardware fingerprint is long,
the testing real-time property is worse, and the expansibility
is bad. However, Our approach builds the feature fingerprint
library without collecting deliberately. You will achieve the
feature fingerprint library as soon as you open the phone.
According to the flow feature testingmethod, the network
flow feature is different when the fake AP is existent or
nonexistent; so, whether Evil-Twin AP is existent or not can
be tested.Themethod is excellent in extendibility but also has
some disadvantages. Beyah et al. [14] utilize the arrival time
space of each data packet to build a flow feature library; as
themethod is influenced by flow shaping greatly, the practical
operation and the applicability are not good; Wei et al. [15]
propose that the arrival time of the ACK data packet in a
TCP protocol can be used to set up the flow feature library;
as the arrival time is influenced by TCP, the testing efficiency
is limited; Sheng et al. [16–18] propose that data round trip
time can be used to test whether the fake AP is existent or
not, but the data round trip time is influenced by the network
type, the bandwidth, and the state of congestion at the same
time.
Besides, Han et al. [38] put forward the wireless fake
AP attack in an in-vehicle network and, meanwhile, give the
testing method based on RSSI. The method requires that all
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of the APs are equipped with GPS modules to report their
own positions; a user judges whether the fake AP is existent
or not through whether the measured RSSI is matched with
the position or not. The method can effectively test the fake
AP attack in the in-vehicle network but is not suitable for
indoor environment because the GPS signal is weakened,
even shielded, indoors.
9. Conclusions
This paper has presented a novel approach to detect fake APs
in a smart home environment. Our approach uses RSSI as the
fingerprint of the authentic AP to detect fake APs. We have
proposed two methods to identity fake APs in two different
scenarios where the genuine AP locates on a single, fixed, or
multiple positions. Our experimental results show that our
approach can detect 90% of the fake APs with little extra
overhead to the communication delay time.
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